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Abstract  
Through deconstruction, Jacques Derrida refutes the possibility of knowledge and meaning and 
moves toward extreme skepticism. A chief Derridean assumption is that the fully free play of 
meaning runs against origin and logos. The present paper, however, endeavors to throw critical 
light on Derrida’s anti-logos theory, and to this end, the eastern philosopher Avicenna will be 
drawn on. Avicennian Ultimate Cause Theory applied, deconstruction will be re-visited arguing that 
signifiers naturally call for a starting place from which they may initiate signification. Nevertheless, 
it will follow that logos is not an obstacle against the semantic free flow; rather, meaning circulates 
freely as a result of infinite similarities among signs, all operating under the auspices of the logos. 
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Introduction 
“In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain 
of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration” (Plato, 1994: 48). 
“Language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique” (Derrida, 1978: 358). Derrida’s 
statement which first appeared in his famous 1966 lecture at Johns Hopkins University is 
illuminating enough of the critical trend he launched under the title of deconstruction. Running 
against classical views of meaning as either fixed or predetermined, Derridean deconstruction 
assumed to unsettle the long-held convictions that would diminish meaning to authorial intentions, 
the supposed organic unity of the text, or to the consciousness of elite readers. Deconstruction 
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declares, and does it clearly, that text contains irreducible contradictory interpretations; the status 
which was later termed aporia (Norris, 2002: 48). More interestingly, literary discourse does not 
preclude Derrida’s critical efforts; he holds that all discourses, literary, critical, philosophical and 
rhetorical, are equally subject to the play of meaning (ibid 23). 
Expounding theory and practice of deconstruction through Writing and Difference, Speech and 
Phenomena, and Of Grammatology (all released during his annus mirabilis 1967), Derrida condemns the 
philosophical tendency to prioritize speech over writing and argues that throughout the western 
metaphysics speech has been associated with presence and accessibility of meaning, while the latter 
form unsettles the illusion of the stable meaning by removing such (pseudo-) origins as author and 
logos and encourages infinitude and polysemy (2002: 30). Derrida’s most famous assertion comes 
from the same book in which the term deconstruction appeared for the first time, Of Grammatology: 
“there is nothing outside the text", (il n’y a pas de hors-texte) (Derrida, 1997: 158). He concentrates 
his philoso/critical attempts on text, and text alone undercuts contextual authorities of any kind. As 
such, deconstruction legitimizes the fully free play of meaning regardless of the type of the 
discourse(s) the text has given scope to. To declare his disapproval of fixity and to embrace 
heterogeneity, Derrida, in line with his mentor Nietzche, writes in a putatively obfuscationist style. 
David Lodge’s comments illuminate further what is meant by the irreducible contradictions, or 
what is conveniently called the blind spots of the text. Anthologizing Derrida’s Structure, Sign, and 
Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences, he regards deconstructive criticism as aiming to show that any 
text inevitably undermines its own claim to have a determinate meaning, and licenses the reader to 
produce his own meanings out of it by an activity of semantic ‘freeplay’” (2000: 88).  
In this view, text comprises of a set of contradictions which lie at each other’s throats, and by being 
so, meaning is pushed to an ephemeral state due to which text, in the wake of reading, demands 
novel interpretations; each interpretation furthering the demand. To endorse the campaign, Derrida 
brings himself to throwing critical light on western philosophy. The poststructuralist theoretician 
assumes that western thought systems have never been able to do away with the notion of 
structurality or center. There has always been a center working as the ultimate referent to which 
signification has stuck as an anchor. This center, Derrida assumes, has performed under such 
chronologically varying designations as God, logos, consciousness, man, truth all working as a 
linked succession merely to perpetuate the axis. Nonetheless, he maintains, a varying center cannot 
be thought of as an origin: 
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[...] henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, that the center could 
not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was not a 
fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions 
come to play (1978: 353-4). 
In absence of a transcendental signified to hinder semantic circulation, the poststructuralist thinker 
proceeds toward assuming that discourse leads to infinite play of signification. Derrida disbelieves 
in origins to the point that - for all his indebtedness - even as Heidegger comes to consider the 
moment of being as the authentic ground for thought, he bursts out to relegate it to “another 
classic case of the familiar metaphysical hankering after truth and origins” (2002: 68). Yet unlike 
Heidegger, Nietzche disputes western metaphysicality and persuades Derrida to exult over the sight 
of “a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active 
interpretation” (1978: 369). To him “truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions [...] coins which have their obverse effaced and which are no longer of value as coins but 
only as metal [...] ” (cited in 1997: xxii). 
Critique: Avicenna and the logic of The Ultimate Cause 
Any new philosophical school, though it reject[s] all previous opinions, is bound to answer the old 
[...] questions. But we give no answer to philosophical questions, and instead reject all philosophical 
questions [...] (Carnap, 2011: 5). 
Derrida’s volumes are regarded as seminal contributions to the theory of poststructuralism, and his 
ideas have made strong echoes across such fields as literature, architecture, sociology, and cultural 
studies. Nonetheless, he has been often criticized for the nihilism his theory inadvertently partakes 
of (Wolin, 1992: xiii). Additionally, John Searle did not find clarity in Derrida’s philosophic 
discourse and at a time even accused him of sophistry (Derrida, 1988). Although Derrida’s 
contribution to the postmodern theory is beyond argument, his standpoint toward logos can be 
examined critically by drawing on the (onto)logical vantage point of the eastern philosopher 
Avicenna (980-1037).  
Whereas his contribution to medical sciences are unquestionably significant, Avicenna is better 
appreciated for his achievements in philosophy, his best-known philosophical volume being Book of 
Healing (Kitab al-Shifa), which is a constellation of treatises on Aristotelian logic, metaphysics, 
psychology and natural sciences. Much in the spirit of Aristotle, Avicenna was initially preoccupied 
with aporiai or philosophical puzzlement (Afnan, 1989: 109). In order to obtain resolution, 
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Avicenna sought ontological exposition in metaphysics. The eastern philosopher commences with 
ontological analysis of the modalities of being; namely impossibility, contingency, and necessity 
(1989: 116). He explains that while the impossible being is that which cannot come to existence, the 
contingent-in-itself (mumkin bi-dhatihi) has the potential to be or not to be. When actualized, the 
contingent becomes a “necessary existent due to what is other than itself” (wajib al-wujud bi-ghayrihi). 
Consequently, contingency is a potential being and it may only be actualized by an external cause 
other than itself. To further the existential realm, he adds that the metaphysical structures of 
necessity and contingency are highly dissimilar. Avicenna argued that existence cannot follow from 
the essence of existing things, or that form and matter by themselves cannot collaborate to bring 
about the developing actualization of the existing things (Belo, 2007: 75). The cause of matter is 
form in conjunction with a separate agent, or active intelligence, which Avicenna calls the Giver of 
Forms, “and in the last resort is God himself” (1989: 112). Between the existential modalities 
Avicenna presents, what necessarily intervenes is creation, which takes place in successive stages of 
emanation from “the Supremely Necessary Being who is God” (ibid: 116). Necessary being due to 
itself (wajib al-wujud bi-dhatihi) is true in itself, while the contingent being has a conditional character 
and is false in itself and at the same time true due to something other than itself. The necessary due 
to itself, Avicenna concludes, is the source of its own being without being emanated from another 
existence and therefore always exists (Avicenna, 1975: 36). 
The theory of the necessary due to itself or wajib al-wujud, which for the sake of convenience we call 
The Ultimate Cause Theory, is capable to allow for critiquing Derridean disappearance of logos at 
the sight of freeplay. Cause and effect relationship, regarded as a chain connecting one effect to its 
cause, then turning itself into an effect calling for another cause is the essence of how Avicenna 
explains the universe. Avicenna argues this chain must stop somewhere in order to make possible 
the existence of lower causes in the chain. He calls that ultimate cause wajib al-wujud, or the 
necessary being due to itself. Naturally, he argues, if Logos - best exemplified here by wajib al-
wujud - does not exist, all lower causes in the chain would collapse and/or would not come to 
existence in the first place (Wisnovsky, 2003: 227). Based on this ontologically upward perspective, 
one may rightly argue that every sign in the universe - whether written, objective or else - implies 
the existence of (a set of) higher causes, leading ultimately to wajib al-wujud or logos. 
Insofar as the Ultimate Cause Theory is concerned, wajib al-wujud is the origin of the signs. 
Eastern theo/teleology adheres to an ultra-natural concept to make an apology for our world of 
signs. In this oriental framework, every sign is an indicator of numerous greater chains of signs 
which ultimately anchor in the same land from which they take origin both physically and 
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semantically. Derrida, from another angle, notes the heterogeneous paths signification may take 
from text, and warns against logos as limiting the circulation of meaning. To Derrida, text, and no 
authority beyond the text, is able to propel the inexhaustible rocket of meanings, which more than 
often take heterogonous trails. Despite Derrida’s claim, a retrospective look at the bottom of the 
rocket reveals how indebted signification is to logos in the first place. From an Avicennian 
viewpoint, logos is the original disseminator of meaning(s): it is the Ultimate Cause from which 
signs are emanated and to which their existence is contingent. Derrida makes every effort to refute 
the actuality of center, while from the logical standpoint of Avicenna, center - under the title of 
axis, pivot, structure or any other designation - is the starting point to help to actualize the existence 
of signs and of signification. In big picture, aporia, once Aristotelian and now Derridean, is not 
obstructed by the center from which it may take its existence. Free circularity cannot stand at odds 
with the center from which it derives its provisional status: In Avicennian language, logos is the 
necessary being to help to make realized the actuality of free signification. 
Compromise and Supplementation: 
Thus far it is argued that logos does not infringe on semantic heterogeneity; it is even the only 
cause to actualize it. However, with this logical fundamentalist view as Avicenna suggests, how can 
one account for the actuality of polysemy in the face of logos; how is it that various contradictory 
meanings are wrung out of the same text despite the fact they all rhizome, in a Deleuzian image, 
from the one and the same stalk; to put it in simple tongue, how can one settle between the 
Avicennian idea of the authentic origin and the Derridean veracity of multiple meanings. To make 
such a settlement, one feels obliged to illuminate the nature of the relationship among signs, or 
between the signifier and the signified in particular. As a (post)structuralist assumption, any natural 
perception of the relationship between signifier and the signified is illusory (2002: 128). On the 
other side, the (theo)logical view offered by Avicenna signposts us to the cause-and-effect chain. 
From a logical viewpoint, finally, the desired settlement follows from the convergence of the two. 
The relationship, as for its nature, can best be characterized as based on similarities between signs. 
Such a view encourages the fully free play of meaning, while concurrently it does not dispute the 
actuality of logos. Different signs/concepts e.g. bicycle, shopping, tree, catching cold, etc. - while 
classifiable in due categories - all fall under the broad term of existents. “It becomes clear that the 
only thing that they all share in common [...] is that they are existents” (McGinnis, 2010: 152). As 
signs unanimously share this category, one can straightforwardly find infinite similarities among 
them, even between the least likely to share a feature. Let us examine autumn and woman as two 
seemingly disparate signs. Although the signs belong to different localized categories, both are 
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existents (albeit the former concept-temporal and the latter objective) and share such grounds the 
category of the existents may offer; and in this case, they hold in common attraction and ripeness 
(hence coupling of the two in the second stanza metaphor in John Keats’ To Autumn). With a 
push, the infinite similarities give way to fully free play of meaning: sharing feature enables a 
signifier to move from one signified to another, and the infinite similarities among signs render the 
circulation unstoppable. Let us consider another example in the light of this new perspective. As a 
result of the restless signified-signifier circulation, the initially innocent sentence “The office was 
open” gives way to an assortment of diverse interpretations: “The office is not open now; the office 
might be open now; the office men were open to criticism; the office men are intolerant of 
criticism; the office women had an open mind for negotiation; Last night the office was burgled for 
it was not locked; ... .” 
Regarding the example, what brings about multiplicity in meaning is (not necessarily the absence of 
logos, but) the countless inevitable similarities among the concepts/signs office, office men, and 
office door; or between physically open (as for door) and mentally open (as per mind), etc. Sharing 
features, or more simply similarity, is what facilitates for the linguistic sign office to move from 
signifying one thing to indicating others. Similarity lubricates free circulation and encourages the 
progressive development of any signified to signifiers as the signification furthers itself, or as the 
obsessive “interpretation of interpretation” demands (1978: 370). Derrida assumption was that any 
illusion of center has, in the long course of history, kept a tight rein on the freeplay of meaning, 
while from a broader vantage point, the very center makes possible the existence of contingent 
signs from which free circulation originates. In the first place, if there had been no center, there 
would have come to place no signification from which to start any semantic play. Although 
meaning may circulate generously from one to other layers, it does not nullify the center from 
which it borrows its existence. In this combined picture, free circularity is a result of ceaseless 
similarities among the signs emanating from and working under the auspices of logos. 
Consequently, one can add to “There is nothing outside the text” the supplement that “but the text, 
not just to be the infinitude as it is, prerequires an origin, from which to proceed and under the egis 
of which to circulate in freeplay. 
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